Can AI Help Us to Understand Belief? Sources, Advances, Limits, and Future Directions.

Andrea Vestrucci; Sara Lumbreras; Lluis Oviedo

doi:10.9781/ijimai.2021.08.003

Authors

Andrea Vestrucci Graduate Theological Union
Sara Lumbreras Universidad Pontificia Comillas
Lluis Oviedo Pontifical University Antonianum

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.9781/ijimai.2021.08.003

Keywords:

Artificial Intelligence, Beliefs, Religion, Computational Model, AI Limits

Abstract

The study of belief is expanding and involves a growing set of disciplines and research areas. These research programs attempt to shed light on the process of believing, understood as a central human cognitive function. Computational systems and, in particular, what we commonly understand as Artificial Intelligence (AI), can provide some insights on how beliefs work as either a linear process or as a complex system. However, the computational approach has undergone some scrutiny, in particular about the differences between what is distinctively human and what can be inferred from AI systems. The present article investigates to what extent recent developments in AI provide new elements to the debate and clarify the process of belief acquisition, consolidation, and recalibration. The article analyses and debates current issues and topics of investigation such as: different models to understand belief, the exploration of belief in an automated reasoning environment, the case of religious beliefs, and future directions of research.

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